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JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code
Section 78A-3-102(3)0) (2008) and Rule 42(a)(4) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure.

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellee Skyline Electric does not take any particular issue with the statement of
the case contained in Appellant's opening brief. Not included in Appellants' statement of
the course of proceedings, however, is the following information pertinent to the district
court's disposition of this case below as it specifically relates to Skyline Electric:
When Appellee UPS filed its Renewed Motion to Dismiss Based on Mootness on
January 3, 2008, (R. 719-721), Appellee Skyline Electric also joined in UPS's Renewed
Motion to Dismiss. (R.1178; Addendum 1). The district court's Order Re: Defendants'
Renewed Motion to Dismiss Based on Mootness entered June 12, 2008, which granted
the Renewed Motion to Dismiss and dismissed with prejudice all of Appellants'
negligence claims and all damage claims related to Appellants' intentional misconduct
and tortious interference causes of action—except as otherwise noted in the
Order—applied equally to Appellee Skyline Electric as it did to all other Appellees.1 (R.
1177-1179; Addendum 1). The district court's Memorandum Decision and Order Re:
Defendants' Renewed Motion to Dismiss entered September 9, 2008, later specifically
dismissed with prejudice all remaining causes of action alleged against Appellee Skyline
Electric. (R. 1228-1236, 1239; Addendum 2).

J

This was specifically clarified in the district court's subsequent memorandum
decision entered on September 9, 2008, which stated that the June 12, 2008 Order
included dismissing the claims as alleged against Skyline Electric. (R.1227; Addendum 2)
2

SUMMARY OF SKYLINE ELECTRICS ARGUMENT
The district court correctly dismissed with prejudice all claims and causes of action
against Appellee Skyline Electric Company. Appellants Hills have accordingly conceded
in their opening brief the correctness of the district court's decisions and orders below as
they pertain to Skyline Electric. The district court's rulings and orders dismissing these
claims should therefore be affirmed as to Skyline Electric.
ARGUMENT
THE DISTRICT COURT'S RULINGS AND ORDERS BELOW AS THEY
PERTAIN TO APPELLEE SKYLINE ELECTRIC SHOULD BE AFFIRMED
In their Statement of the Issues, and throughout their brief, Appellants have
conceded that the district court's ruling was correct with regard to its dismissal with
prejudice of all the claims and causes of action Appellants alleged against Appellee
Skyline Electric in this action. Appellants have not asserted any error in the district
court's ruling insofar as it specifically pertains to the dismissal of claims against Skyline
Electric, and instead have expressly noted their concession that the claims asserted against
Skyline Electric were properly dismissed. Appellants' brief contains no further
discussion of the district court's dismissal of the claims against Skyline Electric.
It is well settled that issues and arguments "not presented in the opening brief are
considered waived and will not be considered by the appellate court." Brown v. Glover,
2000 UT 89 1J23, 16 P.3d 540, 545 (2000). The Utah Rules of Appellate procedure
require an appellant to provide "[a] statement of the issues presented for review," and
3

"[a]n argument... with respect to the issues presented." Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(5), 9.
Where no statement of an issue is provided and an opening brief lacks any meaningful
analysis, argument, or citation to authority, Utah's appellate courts have routinely
concluded that such issues and arguments are thereby waived for the appeal and will not
be reviewed. See Allen v. Friel 2008 UT 56 Iff7-8, 194 P.3d 903, 907 (2008) (stating
that "an appellant must allege the lower court committed an error that the appellate court
should correct," and "if an appellant does not challenge a final order of the lower court on
appeal, that decision will be placed beyond the reach of further review"); See also, e.g.,
Maak v. IHC Health Services. Inc.. 2007 UT App 244 TP0-31, 166 P.3d 631, 639 (2007).
Because Appellants have not raised any issues concerning the district court's
rulings and orders dismissing with prejudice all causes of action and claims as alleged
against Skyline Electric, it goes without saying that it is unnecessary for Skyline Electric
to further elaborate on the correctness of the district court's decision as it relates to
Skyline Electric. Skyline Electric therefore requests that this Court explicitly affirm the
district court's actions below in dismissing with prejudice all causes of action and claims
against Skyline Electric.
CONCLUSION
In light of Appellants' concession that the district court's rulings and orders below
were correct insofar as they relate specifically to Appellee Skyline Electric, this Court
should affirm the district court's rulings and orders below. Appellants have otherwise

4

waived the opportunity to raise any issues with the dismissal of the claims and causes of
action against Skyline Electric by failing to properly brief such issues. Skyline Electric
therefore requests that this Court explicitly affirm the district court's actions below in
dismissing with prejudice all causes of action and claims against Skyline Electric
DATED this z M J a y of April, 2009.
MORGAN, MINNOCK, RICE & JAMES, L.C.

=^g

Dennis R. James
/—/
Brian H. Hess
/
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee
Skyline Electric Company.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, WEST JORDAN DIVISION STATE OF UTAH
BRUCE HILLS AND JUDITH HILLS
Individually, and as natural parents and heirs of
MARK D. HILLS (deceased);
Plaintiffs,
vs.

[muLiflcieBiq O R D E R n * RE:
DEFENDANTS' RENEWED MOTION
TO DISMISS BASED ON MOOTNESS
Civil No. 1:050407708
Judge Terry Christiansen

UNITED PARCEL SERVICE INC., an Ohio
corporation; UPSCO UNITED PARCEL
SERVICE CO., a Delaware corporation
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE INC., a Utah
corporation; LIBERTY MUTUAL HOLDING
COMPANY, INC., a Massachusetts Mutual
Holding Company; LIBERTY MUTUAL FIRE
INSURANCE COMPANY, a Massachusetts
Mutual Holding Company; and SKYLINE
ELECTRIC COMPANY, a Utah corporation,
Defendants.
BRUCE HILLS AND JUDITH HILLS
Individually, and as natural parents and heirs of
MARK D. HILLS (deceased):

Civil No. 1:040107128
Judge Stephen Roth

Plaintiffs,
vs.
SKYLINE ELECTRIC COMPANY, a Utah
corporation,
Defendant.
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Defendant United Parcel Service Inc. ("UPS") filed a renewed motion to dismiss the
claims asserted by plaintiffs Bruce Hills and Judith Hills ("Plaintiffs") in the case of Hills v.
United Parcel Service Inc, et al, Civil No. 1:050407708 (Christiansen, J.) ("Hills IF).
Defendants Liberty Mutual and Skyline Electric Co. filed motions joining in UPS's renewed
motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs filed an opposition, and UPS filed a reply brief. UPS's renewed
motion to dismiss was submitted for decision, and a hearing was held on March 31, 2008, at
which counsel for UPS, Liberty Mutual, and Plaintiffs appeared and presented oral argument.
Having considered UPS's renewed motion to dismiss, the opposition thereto, oral argument, and
the record in this case, it is hereby:
ORDERED that Skyline's Cross-Claims asserted against UPS in Hills II be, and hereby
are, DISMISSED with prejudice. It is further
ORDERED that Plaintiffs' First Claim for Relief—Negligence asserted in Hills //be, and
hereby is, DISMISSED with prejudice. It is further
ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Second Claim for Relief—Intentional Misconduct asserted in
Hills //be, and hereby is, DISMISSED with prejudice to the extent such a claim seeks damages
identified in Paragraphs 96(a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (g), and (i) of Plaintiffs' Hills II Complaint
.and Demand for Jury Trial ("Hills //Complaint"). Plaintiffs can continue to seek from Skyline
Electric Co. through the Hills I litigation the damages identified in Paragraphs 96 (a), (b), (c),
(d), (e), (f), (g), and (i) of Plaintiffs' Hills //Complaint. Plaintiffs' Second Claim for Relief is not
dismissed to the extent it seeks damages identified in Paragraphs 96(h), (j), (k), and (1). Pending
supplemental briefing, the Court reserves its decision on whether the remaining aspects of
Plaintiffs' Second Claim for Relief should be dismissed. It is further

00117S
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ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Third Claim for Relief—Tortious Interference asserted in
Hills //be, and hereby is DISMISSED with prejudice to the extent such a claim seeks damages
identified in Paragraphs 96 (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (g), and (i) of Plaintiffs' /////^//Complaint.
Plaintiffs can continue to seek from Skyline Electric Co. through the Hills I litigation the
damages identified in Paragraphs 96 (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (g), and (i) of Plaintiffs' Hills II
Complaint. Plaintiffs' Third Claim for Relief in Hills II is not dismissed to the extent it seeks
damages identified in Paragraphs 96 (h), (j), (k), and (1). Pending supplemental briefing, the
Court reserves its decision on whether the remaining aspects of Plaintiffs' Third Claim for Relief
should be dismissed. It is further
ORDERED that UPS, Liberty Mutual, and Plaintiffs shall submit supplemental briefing
on whether, given Plaintiffs' Hills //Complaint and Skyline Electric Co.'s admission of liability
in Hills v. Skyline Electric Co., Civil No. 1:040107128 (Roth, J.), Plaintiffs Second and Third
Claims for Relief remain viable such that Plaintiffs would be entitled to recover through the
Hills //case the damages asserted in Paragraphs 96(h), (j), (k), and (1). UPS's and Liberty
Mutual's respective supplemental opening briefs shall be due on or before May 1, 2008, limited
to 10 pages. See Utah R. Civ. P. 7(c)(2). Plaintiffs' supplemental responsive brief shall be due
on or before June 1, 2008, limited to 10 pages. Id UPS's and Liberty Mutual's respective
supplemental reply briefs shall be due on or before June 15, 2008, limited to 5 pages. Id
DATED this _J£_ d a y of ^ o v v ^

, 2008.

THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, SALT LAKE COUNTY
WEST JORDAN DIVISION

morable Tqny QhristianseiT
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ADDENDUM 2

THIRD DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
WEST JORDAN DEPARTMENT

BRUCE HILLS AND JUDITH HILLS,
individually, and as natural parents and heirs
of MARK D. HILLS (deceased),
Plaintiffs,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS'
RENEWED MOTION TO DISMISS

vs.
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE INC., an Ohio
corporation; UPSCO UNITED PARCEL
SERVICE CO., a Delaware corporation;
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE INC., a Utah
corporation; LIBERTY MUTUAL
HOLDING COMPANY, INC., a
Massachusetts Mutual Holding Company;
LIBERTY MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE
COMPANY, a Massachusetts Mutual
Holding Company; and SKYLINE
ELECTRIC COMPANY, a Utah corporation,

Case No. 050407708
Judge Terry L. Christiansen

Defendants.

This matter came before the Court on September 3,2008, for hearing on Defendants United
Parcel Service Inc., UPSCO United Parcel Service Co., and United Parcel Service Inc., (collectively
referred to as "UPS") Renewed Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs claims. Edward P. Moriarity and
Bradley L. Booke, appeared on behalf of Plaintiffs, Jason Schwartz, Daniel Davis, Taggart Hansen
and Kira M. Slawson appeared on behalf of UPS, Dennis R. James appeared on behalf of Liberty
Mutual Fire Insurance Company and Liberty Mutual Holding Company, Inc. (collectively referred
to as "Liberty Mutual") and Gary L. Johnson appeared on behalf of Skyline Electrical Company

001224

("Skyline")- Having considered the parties arguments, supplemental briefs, the applicable law, and
the record in this case, the Court issues the following Memorandum Decision and Order:

BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs are the parents of a former UPS employee, Mark D. Hills, who died in an
electrical accident while performing his work in August 2003. Plaintiffs filed Hills v. Skyline
Electric Co., civil no. 040107125 (Roth, J.) ("Hills I") in October 2004, against Skyline alleging
that its negligence caused the death of their son.
While engaged in discovery in Hills i, Plaintiffs filed this law suit, known as Hills II, in
September 2005, alleging that Defendants negligently and intentionally spoliated evidence in
connection with the electrocution of Mark D. Hills and intentionally hindered the Hills I
litigation. See Hills //Complaint dated August 16, 2005,ffif32-55 and 69-94. Plaintiffs alleged
Defendant's conduct proximately caused them damages and sought punitive damages, damages
resulting from tortuous interference with a legal cause of action, damages resulting from
hindrance with a lawful cause of action and any other damages.1 See id at ^f 96(h), (j), (k), and
(i).
Skyline answered Plaintiffs complaint and filed cross claims against UPS. UPS and
Liberty Mutual filed motions to dismiss both Plaintiffs complaint and Skyline's cross claims.
The Court initially stayed ruling on UPS and Liberty Mutuals' motions to dismiss
pending resolution of Hills /because (1) the discovery for Hills I and Hills II had been
consolidated and would permit the parties to determine exactly what occurred that caused the

1

Other damages were also claimed, but these were dismissed pursuant to the Court's
June 12, 2008 Order.
2

00122?

electrocution death of Mark D. Hills and what changes were made and by whom to the scene of
thi accident which constitute the "spoliation of evidence"claim; (2) the issue of whether Utah
colirts recognize the tort of "spoliation of evidence" has not been determined and (3) it is
netessary for Hills I to be resolved to determine whether plaintiffs are unable to prove their case
in Hills I before determining that such inability was due to "spoliated evience."
After three years of discovery, Skyline amended their answer in Hills I to admit liability,
but still dispute the damages alleged by Plaintiffs. Thereafter, UPS renewed its motion to
disniss in this case, Hills II, and Liberty Mutual and Skyline joined in the motion. The Court
granted UPS' Renewed Motion to Dismiss Skyline's cross claim and granted in part and reserved
in part UPS' Renewed Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint in an Order dated June 12, 2008.
Literty Mutual and Skyline filed motions to join UPS' Renewed Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiffs
filtd an opposition and UPS filed a reply, which was joined by Liberty Mutual and Skyline.
A hearing on the motion was held on March 31, 2008, wherein Plaintiffs, UPS, Liberty
Mftual and Skyline appeared and presented oral argument. The Court ruled on a majority of the
issues in an order dated June 12, 2008. In that Order, the Court reserved decision on Plaintiffs'
Sepond and Third Claims for Relief to the extent those claims sought damages identified in
Paragraphs 96(h), (j), (k), and (1). Plaintiffs' second claim for relief is intentional misconduct
a n | the third claim for relief is tortuous interference. Both of these claims appear to be
intfcntional spoliation of evidence claims and at the hearing sounded like abuse of process claims.
Th|e damages claims related to these claims for purposes of this motion are in Paragraph 96,
suf sections (h) Punitive damages; (j) Damages resulting from tortuous interference with a legal
cause of action; (k) Damages resulting from hindrance with a lawful cause of action and (1) Any

HILLS vs. UPS, et al.
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damages provided by law, equity, or court ruling in accordance with the laws of the State of
Utah.
The Court requested supplemental briefs on whether, given Plaintiffs' Hills //Complaint
and Skyline Electric Company's admission of liability in Hills /, Plaintiffs Second and Third
Claims for Relief remain viable after Skyline's admission of liability in Hills I such that
Plaintiffs would be entitled to recover through this case the damages asserted in Paragraphs
96(h), (j), (k), and (1). Plaintiffs, UPS, Liberty Mutual and Skyline have filed supplemental briefs
on the issue. A hearing was held on September 3, 2008.
SKYLINE ELECTRIC AND LIBERTY MUTUAL'S MOTIONS TO JOIN
IN UPS5 RENEWED MOTION TO DISMISS
Before addressing UPS' Renewed Motion to Dismiss, the Court will first address a matter
raised by Liberty Mutual and Skyline. Apparently, there was some confusion on the application
of the June 12, 2008 Order to Skyline and Liberty Mutual. UPS' renewed motion to dismiss was
filed by the UPS defendants. The other defendants, Liberty Mutual and Skyline, filed motions to
join UPS' renewed motion to dismiss. Liberty Mutual is UPS' workman's compensation
insurance carrier. Skyline is the electric company that performed the electrical work at UPS'
work site where the death of Mr. Hills occurred. Plaintiffs did not oppose Liberty Mutual and
Skyline's motions to join. To avoid misunderstanding and to clarify application of the June 12,
2008 Order, the language of the Court's June 12, 2008 Order clearly reflect that Liberty Mutual
and Skyline were included in that Order.

001227
HILLS vs. UPS, et al.
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LAW
A court may dismiss a case if the party fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted. Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A motion to dismiss under subdivision (b)(6) admits the facts
alleged in the complaint, but challenges Plaintiffs right to relief based on those facts. St.
Benedict'sDev. Co. v. St Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194 (Utah 1991). All reasonable
inferences to be drawn from the facts should be made in a light most favorable to Plaintiff.
P^ows v. State, 822 P.2d 764 (Utah 1991). A complaint is required to give the opposing party
fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds of the claim and a general indication of the type of
lif gation involved, or it is subject to dismissal under subdivision (b)(6). Utah Steel & Iron Co. v.
BDsch, 475 P.2d 1019 (1970).
I
INTENTIONAL SPOLIATION CLAIMS
Plaintiffs claim that although specific torts entitled "intentional misconduct" or "tortuous
interference" do not exist in Utah, the substance of these claims constitute acts of intentional
interference. Intentional interference is a tort that has been acknowledged by the Utah Supreme
dourt. Plaintiffs argue that although intentional interference is often associated with business
rtlations, intentional interference within the context of harm to prospective economic relations
creates the logical foundation for spoliation claims. Plaintiffs argue that the role and impact of
UPS, Liberty Mutual and Skyline's (collectively referred to as "Defendants") intentional
interference with evidence and the investigation pertaining to Mr. Hills' death in Hills /remains
t t be seen.2 In Hills /, Skyline still denies any damages. Plaintiffs argue that if they are unable to
2

The Court notes that at the March 31, 2008 hearing, Plaintiffs made arguments based
ipon facts and a new theory that were not in the Complaint and Demand for jury trial. Plaintiffs

0<0122S
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prove damages or damages are seriously impaired Plaintiffs5 interference with a legal remedy
claim remains viable. Plaintiffs argue that these proceedings have impacted Plaintiffs'
expectancy in Hills land Defendants cannot claim a legal "right" to inject such deceit into a
lawsuit.
As acknowledged by Plaintiffs, ""intentional misconduct" or "tortuous interference"
claims do not exist in Utah. Plaintiffs argue that the Utah Supreme Court has recognized these
torts as plead by Plaintiffs. The Court disagrees. While the tort of intentional interference with
economic relations has been recognized by the Utah Supreme Court in Leigh Funiture and
Carpet Co. V. horn, 657 P.2d 293, 301 (Utah 1982), it is a big leap to jump from economic
relations to spoliation of evidence. Nevertheless, the label is unimportant, and the substance of

argued that these facts were included in the Complaint, however, the Court disagrees. These
additional facts relate to a long chain of legal events that ensued after Mr. Hills death. Plaintiffs
argue that the issue of how Defendants' malfeasance resulted in a chain of unnecessary legal
proceedings by increasing the costs of suit or, in that matter, even necessitating a full blown law
suit is still an issue.
From reviewing the facts in the Complaint and those additional facts in the briefs and
even viewing those facts in a light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the Court is not persuaded that
Defendants did anything more than defend their respective interests and participate in the legal
process. Wrongful death cases, by their very nature are cases that generally do not resolve
quickly. Any claim for damages relating to a delay should be decided in the damages portion of
Hills /, not here, an independent law suit for intentional spoliation. If Defendants had hindered
or delayed for an improper purpose, this Court would expect to see motions to compel and
motions for sanctions in Hills I. However, no such motions have been filed in Hills L Moreover,
Plaintiffs may have been premature in filing the present law suit because the litigation in Hills I
had not concluded and there was no way to determine whether the acts of Defendants had
affected the value of Plaintiffs claims in Hills I. This case was stayed even before deciding a
motion to dismiss in part because it was "necessary for Hills I to be resolved to determine
whether plaintiffs are unable to prove their case in Hills 1before determining that such inability
was due to 'spoliated evience.'" Nevertheless, these additional facts and new theory are
improperly raised in response to a motion to dismiss a complaint that does not include them.
Therefore, the Court refrains from making a ruling on these arguments.

HILLS vs. UPS, et al.
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the actions is what concerns this Court. Plaintiffs appear to be claiming an independent tort of
irltentional spoliation of evidence.3
Spoliation can be traced back to an ancient Latin phrase: Contra Spoliatorem Omnia
Pfaesumuntur, which literally means all things presumed against the destroyer. The concept of
punishing those who interfere with the legal rights of another has been around in some form for
ctnturies. Such punishment includes: the adverse inference jury instruction that declares the
destruction of relevant evidence gives rise to an inference that the thing which has been destroyed
of mutilated would have been unfavorable to the position of the party responsible for the
sf oliation; discovery sanctions that may include dismissal of a case; and statutory criminal
prosecution.
In 1984, the concept of spoliation of evidence as an independent tort was conceived.
Cjalifomia was the first state to adopt spoliation as an independent cause of action in a first party
ctise, Smith v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 829, 831 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984). However,
California has since retreated from its earlier decision to recognize spoliation as an independent
t#rt, see Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. Superior Court, 954 P.2d 511, 521 (Cal. I998)(refusing
t<§ acknowledge an independent tort of intentional first-party spoliation and rejecting the Smith
ctmrt's acceptance of the tort) and the Temple Community Hospital v. Superior Court, 976 P.2d
2123, 233 (Cal. \999){rejecting an independent tort of third party spoliation).

3

Defendants argue that the Court's dismissal of the negligent spoliation of evidence
[aim should result in the dismissal of these "identical claims." The Court disagrees that the
[aims are identical. There is a difference between a negligent and intentional tort. The state of
and for each is different, therefore, the dismissal of the negligent tort does not necessarily
reclude the intentional tort.
HILLS vs. UPS, et al.
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Neither the intentional nor the negligent spoliation of evidence as an independent tort has
been adopted in Utah.4 The single case substantively addressing an area of the spoliation of
evidence doctrine by name is Burns v. Cannondale Bicycle Co., 876 P.2d 415, 419 (UT App.
1994). In Burns, a product liability case, the trial court granted summary judgment because
Plaintiff could not show the bicycle at issue was defective. Plaintiff claimed that he could not
provide proof because Defendant had destroyed the evidence of the defect and requested there be
an evidentiary inference against Defendant that the bike was defective. The trial court refused
Plaintiffs request. On appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals stated: "While Burns cites no authority
demonstrating that Utah has adopted the spoliation doctrine, we conclude that it would not apply
to the facts of this case in any event." Id. The Court concluded that the requirements for
establishing an evidentiary inference based on spoliation had not been met because Defendants
were not and could not have been on notice of Burns contemplation to sue and there was no
independent duty to retain the allegedly defective part.
The limited area of the spoliation of evidence doctrine cited by the Burns Court applied to
a negligent first party and the remedy sought was an evidentiary inference. In this case, Plaintiffs
filed an independent tort action for the intentional spoliation of the evidence against Defendants,
first party Skyline and third parties UPS and Liberty Mutual, and the remedy sought is damages.
For a doctrine that has not been adopted in Utah, this is a great leap from a negligent first party
and the remedy of an adverse inference to an independent tort for intentional spoliation of the
evidence and a remedy of damages.

4

The single Utah Supreme Court case citing the spoliation of evidence doctrine, State v.
Seventy-Three Thousand One Hundred Thirty Dollars, 2001 UT 67, does no more than name the
doctrine because the Court resolved the case on another ground for the appeal.
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The spoliation of evidence doctrine has been discussed and sparingly applied in various
foi||ms throughout the United States.5 There appears to be a national debate on whether spoliation
oflhe evidence should be an independent tort and if so, what acts should trigger the tort
(nfgligent, intentional or both), what type of evidence should it extend to (limited to physical
evidence or include all evidence), who should the tort extend to (first parties, third parties or
both), and what should the remedy be (adverse inference, sanctions, dismissal, maximum
dajnages, or a combination thereof).6 Surprisingly, Utah has not entered into the fray of this
natonal debate. Since the spoliation of evidence doctrine has not been adopted in Utah in any
foim, this Court does not have a set rule or factors to apply to the parties to determine whether
Plaintiffs fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
General tort law requires a plaintiff to prove that a defendant proximately caused Plaintiff
damages. To prove a defendant proximately caused Plaintiff damages in a spoliation of evidence
claim Plaintiff must show that: "(1) plaintiff pursued the initial civil action, and was unsuccessful
betause of the absence of the destroyed evidence, or at the very least, that the destruction of the
evidence in question made pursuing the initial claim impossible; and (2) that the destroyed

5

USLAW Network, Inc., USLAW Spoliation of Evidence Compendium (2005),
http://uslawnetwork.org/files/public/Spoliation Compendium.pdf provides a brief summary of
th4 spoliation law in each of the states.
6

For additional information on the national debate relating to spoliation of evidence as
an independent tort and the application of the doctrine there are various sources to refer. See
Rajphel L. Sykes, Comment, A Phantom Menace: Spoliation of Evidence in Idaho Civil Cases, 42
Idaho L. Rev. 821 (2006); Stefan Rubin, Note, Tort Reform: A Call for Florida to Scale Back its
Independent Tort for the Spoliation of Evidence, 51 Fla. L. Rev. 345 (April 1999); Honorable
Margaret O'Mara Frossard et al., Spoliation of Evidence in Illinois: The Law After Boyd v.
Traveler's Insurance Co., 28 Loy. U. Chi. LJ. 685 (Summer 1997); Ariel Porat et al., Liability
fon Uncertainty: Making Evidential Damage Actionable, 18 Cardozo L. Rev. 1891 (July 1997).
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evidence would have enabled plaintiff successfully to pursue the initial civil action." Nix v.
Hoke, 139 F. Supp. 2d 125 (D. D.C. 2001). Rather than try to predict whether the Utah Supreme
Court would adopt the spoliation of evidence doctrine, and in what circumstances such doctrine
would apply and what factors of the spoliation of evidence doctrine they would adopt, this Court
will adopt and apply the foregoing two factor analysis in making its decision.
UPS and Liberty Mutual are third party defendants in the context of Plaintiffs' intentional
spoliation of evidence claim. Viewing the facts in a light most favorable to Plaintiffs, they were
having difficulty proving that Skyline's wrongful acts caused Mr. Hills death because of UPS and
Liberty Mutual's acts. Even viewing the facts in a light most favorable to Plaintiffs, Skyline's
recent admission of liability in Hills I clearly establishes that Plaintiffs are successful in the
proving liability in Hills I. Plaintiffs seek "punitive damages," "damages resulting from tortuous
interference with a legal cause of action," "damages resulting from hindrance with a lawful cause
of action" and "any damages provided by law, equity, or court ruling in accordance with the laws
of the state of Utah." Any spoliation of evidence by UPS and Liberty Mutual relates to proving
liability, not damages. Because liability is no longer an issue in Hills I, Plaintiffs' legal remedy
is not affected by UPS and Liberty Mutual's actions. The Court concludes that Plaintiffs
intentional spoliation of evidence claim fails because Plaintiffs cannot show damages caused by
UPS and Liberty Mutual's acts.
As to Plaintiffs argument that their claim against UPS and Liberty Mutual is viable until
after the damages are determined in Hills /, the Court disagrees. Mr. Hill's death is not disputed.
Plaintiffs damages for Mr. Hill's wrongful death were fixed at the moment of Mr. Hill's death.
Nothing the Defendants' did after Mr. Hill's death could affect the value of Plaintiffs damages
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fof his wrongful death. Plaintiffs argue that Defendants actions affected Plaintiffs probable
expectancy in damages, a valuable property right. Defendants could not alter Plaintiffs probable
expectancy in damages. Evidence of damages were frozen at the time of Mr. Hill's death.
Whatever damages Plaintiffs are entitled to receive for Mr. Hill's wrongful death will be
determined in the Hills I case between Plaintiffs and Skyline. All viable damage claims will be
mtde available to Plaintiffs in Hills I.
Plaintiffs argue the delay created by UPS and Liberty Mutual's acts diminished the value
of Ihe their claim in Hills I. Plaintiffs fail to present any case or statutory law that "mere delay
without other injury is actionable" for intentional spoliation of evidence. If there was a showing
thlt Plaintiffs' claims against Skyline were barred by the statute of limitations or Skyline's
insurer was insolvent, then there may be actionable injury. However, Plaintiffs fail to show that
th^re is anything more than mere delay.7 Plaintiffs are not prevented from recovering the full
exient of their damages that they can prove in Hills I.
Although Skyline is a first party to the underlying suit relating to Mr. Hills wrongful
death, Hills /, the same reasoning that applies to UPS and Liberty Mutual applies to Skyline with
regard to the intentional spoliation of evidence claim and the remaining damages. Whatever
damages Plaintiffs are entitled to from Skyline will be determined in Hills L Plaintiffs should
no! have a second bite of the apple against Skyline in continuing Hills //where the issue of
damages will be conclusively decided between them in Hills I.
Plaintiffs argue that punitive damages are claimed here against all of Defendants whereas
HiMs /captures only one defendant, Skyline. Plaintiffs argue that all Defendants should be
7

See supra n.2.
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subject to punitive damages for their actions. Although the Court understands that there are more
parties and deeper pockets with three Defendants in the case at bar, rather than just one in Hills /,
Plaintiffs' desire for punitive damages is an inadequate basis to allow punitive damages to stand
alone. There must be a viable cause of action attached to Plaintiffs' punitive damages claim. As
decided above, Plaintiffs intentional spoliation claim fails, thus there is no meritorious cause of
action to justify a punitive damage award.
Plaintiffs argue that if punitive damages are not allowed as a remedy for Defendants
actions they will escape punishment and there is nothing to deter such action in the future. What
was done by Defendants in altering or destroying evidence is not condoned by this Court. The
law specifically provides sanctions where such actions occur. There was a punishment for UPS'
actions, a fine was imposed by Utah Occupational Safety and Health ("UOSH"), which is the
state entity that investigates accidents at work sites. UOSH has investigated both the death and
subsequent actions of UPS. As a result of their investigation, UOSH imposed a fine against
UPS, the amount of which is beyond this Court's purview. Although Plaintiffs would like a
private right of action to be created with UPS' duty to preserve an accident work site for UOSH
and a claim for punitive damages, Plaintiffs fail to cite a legal basis to do so.
There are other sanctions in place to prevent tampering with evidence. If a company or
employee choose to tamper with evidence, they are subject to criminal charges and
administrative penalties. Individuals that destroy evidence are subject to criminal charges for
Tampering with Evidence in Noncriminal Official Proceedings, Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-510.5, a
class A misdemeanor, and if committed in an official proceeding, a third degree felony. If an
employee of UPS, Liberty Mutual or Skyline knowingly or intentionally altered, destroyed,
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cqncealed or removed anything with the purpose of impairing the veracity or viability of the
thing in a proceeding or investigation that the person knew was pending or about to be instituted
oriwith the intent to prevent an investigation or proceeding, then the person can be prosecuted.
Fdlr a third degree felony conviction, the penalty could include imprisonment in a state prison for
a |erm not to exceed five years and a fine not to exceed $5,000 plus an 85% surcharge. For a
cltss A misdemeanor conviction, the penalty could include imprisonment in jail for a term not to
exceed one year and a fine not to exceed $2,500 plus an 85% surcharge. Utah Code Ann. §§ 763-103,-204,-301.
UPS, Liberty Mutual and/or Skyline could also be held criminally responsible for the
actions of an employee that tampered with evidence pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-204.
THe fines for a felony conviction against one of them shall not exceed $20,000 plus an 85%
sufcharge and for a class A misdemeanor conviction shall not exceed $10,000 plus an 85%
sufcharge. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-302. Additional sanctions could include advertising of
conviction and/or disqualification of officer(s). Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-303.
Based upon the foregoing, the Court concludes that with Skyline's admission to liability
in Bills /, Plaintiffs fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Therefore, the Court
GRANTS the Renewed Motion to Dismiss the second and third causes of action and the
remaining damages claims in favor of UPS, Liberty Mutual and Skyline.

***** Intentionally left blank *****
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II
ALTERNATIVE BASIS TO DISMISS UPS
WORKER'S COMPENSATION ACT EXCLUSIVE REMEDY
UPS alleges that Plaintiffs' admission that their Hills //negligence claim against UPS is
barred by the Utah's Worker's Compensation Act, Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-101 et seq, (the Act)
is fatal to Plaintiffs' remaining claims of intentional misconduct and tortious interference because
the type of act necessary to overcome the Act's exclusivity provisions are not present. Plaintiffs
respond that the Act's exclusive remedy does not bar Plaintiffs' claims of intentional misconduct
and tortuous interference because this case implicates the dual capacity doctrine. Plaintiffs argue
that the Act only bars suit against employers for injuries arising out of the course of employment.
They argue that their injuries relative to these causes of action arose solely out of acts or
omissions that took place after their son's death - matters distinct from on the job injury.
Plaintiffs argue that after Mr. Hills died, UPS could not be acting in its capacity as Mr. Hills
employer. Plaintiffs further argue that UPS was acting outside the scope of its employeremployee relationship with Mark Hills when UPS intentionally altered evidence, lost or
destroyed evidence and UPS employees lied to Utah OSHA investigators, and UPS generally
engaged in a cover up of the cause of Mark Hills' death.
The Worker's Compensation Act "makes it clear that the intent of the legislature is to
provide an exclusive remedy for job related injuries." Hunsaker v. State of Utah, 870 P.2d at 899.
"The dual capacity doctrine directly conflicts with the exclusive remedy provision of [the Act]."
Id. The dual capacity doctrine is an exception to the exclusive-remedy provision of the Act that
has not been adopted in Utah, but the doctrine's existence has been acknowledged in three Utah
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clses, Bingham v. Lagoon Corporation, 707 P.2d 678, 680 (Utah 1985), Stewart v. CMI
(Corporation, 740 P.2d 1340 (Utah 1987); and Hunsaker v. State of Utah, 870 P.2d 893 (Utah
1P93). "Under this doctrine, an employer normally shielded from tort liability by the exclusive
rfmedy principle may become liable in tort to his own employee if he occupies, in addition to his
ctpacity as employer, a second capacity that confers on his obligations independent of those
imposed on him as an employer." Bingham v. Lagoon Corp., 101 P.2d at 680.
The decisive test to determine if the dual capacity doctrine is invokable is not
whether the second function or capacity of the employer is different and separate
from the first. Rather, the test is whether the employer's conduct in the second
role or capacity has generated obligations that are unrelated to those flowing from
the company's or individual's first role as an employer. If the obligations are
related, the doctrine is not applicable. Id.
UPS' conduct that is the basis of Plaintiffs "intentional misconduct" and "tortuous
interference" causes of action relate to UPS' activities after Mr. Hills death. These activities
include: conducting their own investigation of the accident site prior to notifying OSHA or law
enforcement; contacting and working in concert with the co-defendants; removal, alteration of
equipment, material, or other evidence; failure to disclose, misrepresent and/or conceal their
actions to OSHA, and other like allegations. Even viewing the facts in a light most favorable to
Plaintiff, UPS' conduct in its role with OSHA and the co-defendants did not generate obligations
thbt are unrelated to UPS' obligations flowing from its first role as an employer. Therefore, even
assuming the Utah Supreme Court would adopt the dual capacity doctrine, the Court concludes
thlt in this case, the dual capacity doctrine cannot be invoked to overcome the exclusive remedy
shield of the Act as it applies to UPS. As an alternative basis to dismiss UPS, the Court
concludes that the exclusive remedy provision of the Act shields UPS from liability.
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ORDER
The Court hereby ORDERS
UPS' Renewed Motion to Dismiss GRANTED on the second and third causes of action and
the damages claims asserted in Paragraphs 96(h), (j), (k), and (1), therefore, UPS, Liberty Mutual and
Skyline are hereby DISMISSED with prejudice.
DATED this \_ day of September, 2008.

The Hoiiorable TERRYi.
ird: strict Court Judge \ •
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